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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PIamtiff7AppeIIee5 
KATHY HALL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20060407-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion to quash 
her bindover on one count of endangerment of a child, a third degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d).1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Police executing a search warrant on defendant's house smelled an overwhelming 
odor of a methamphetamine lab surrounding the place. They found debris from a meth lab 
in the garage; methamphetamine, scales, packaging material, and pseudoephedrine in a 
transparent drawer in one adult resident's open bedroom; a used meth glass pipe wrapped in 
tissue paper in defendant's closet; and defendant's 13-year-old daughter in the living room. 
!Unless otherwise stated, all code citations are to the West 2004 publication. 
Issue No. 1: Did defendant intentionally or knowingly permit her 13-year-old 
daughter to be exposed to controlled substances, chemical substances, or 
paraphernalia? 
Standard of Review: On appeal, a magistrate's bindover decision is granted some 
deference. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, % 26, 137 P.3d 787. Whether the district court 
properly interpreted Utah's child endangerment statute is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^ 8, 84 P.3d 1171. 
Issue No. 2: Is Utah's child endangerment statue, which proscribes exposing a 
child to controlled substances, chemical substances, or paraphernalia, 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, % 42, 99 P.3d 820. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a 
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other 
chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled 
substance. Intent under this subsection may be demonstrated by the 
substance's use, quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other 
precursors, or to manufacturing equipment. 
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 76-5-
109(l)(a). 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37a-3. 
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(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-
5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, 
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the 
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child or 
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the 
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or elder 
adult, and that it was administered to the child or elder adult in accordance 
with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition as 
in Section 58-37-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of child endangerment, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5, and one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. Rl-3. 
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over on both counts. R70-71, 
80-83, 190-95. 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover on only the child endangerment count, 
arguing that the evidence at preliminary hearing did not support a finding of probable cause, 
and that the "exposed to" language of the child endangerment statute was unconstitutionally 
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vague. R36-49. The district court waited to rule on the motion, pending this Court's 
decisions in State v. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, 128 P.3d 1223, cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589 
(Utah May 25, 2006) and State v. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, 128 P.3d 1220. Rl 17, 160-72, 
180. After those decisions were issued, the district court took supplemental briefing, heard 
oral argument, and denied the motion. Rl60-72, 180. 
This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory review of the denial of her 
motion to quash the bindover on the child endangerment count.2 R185. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
On the afternoon of December 8, 2003, the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit of the Salt 
Lake County Sheriffs Department executed a search warrant on defendant's home. R53-54. 
The unit had received information of a methamphetamine lab and drug dealing at the home. 
R54. Defendant was a primary target of the investigation. R55, 61. 
An overwhelming odor 
As Detective Wester, the lead investigator, reached the curb in front of the house, he 
could smell the "overwhelming" odor of a meth lab. R59. While he was not sure whether 
he could also smell the odor inside the house, he could smell it behind the house. R59. 
2The possession of paraphernalia count is not at issue on this appeal. 
3The record contains only an unofficial transcript, prepared by the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender's Association, found at R53-71 in the pleadings file. The State does not object 
to using this unofficial transcript for purposes of this interlocutory appeal, but has taken 
the liberty of correcting spelling and punctuation errors when quoting the transcript. 
Also, in keeping with well-settled appellate principles of review, the following facts are 
recited "in a light most favorable to the prosecution . . . resolv[ing] all inferences in favor 
of the prosecution." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). 
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Before entering the detached garage, officers donned protective gear—respirators and 
hazmat suits.4 R60, 65. There, in addition to the odor, they found debris from a meth lab, 
including bottles (some empty) of HEET,5 black tape, and stained rubber gloves. R59. 
Detective Wester, who had training in both narcotics and clandestine labs, explained that 
HEET is used to break up ephedrine or the glue used on striker plates and matches, which 
helps break up red phosphorous. R59. The black tape is used to connect pipes. R59. The 
officers did not test or seize the rubber gloves because "by products of methamphetamine are 
potentially carcinogenic; they are definitely considered hazardous waste and [police] cannot 
take those into evidence." R67. 
"[A] 11 the doors in every room wferej open" 
Inside the house were seven people, including defendant's 13-year-old daughter, 
Tiffany.6 R55-56, 60. Tiffany, who had no visible physical impairments, was in the living 
room, upstairs or on the main floor. R56. Defendant was in the process of moving out and 
"all the doors in every room w[ere] open." R57. Two of those open doors led to the 
> 
basement bedrooms of Teresa Albretson and defendant. R57, 60. 
4The unofficial transcript says "Tagget" suits. R60. That appears to be a mis-
transcription, because the State could find no information regarding protective "Tagget" 
suits used for meth or other hazardous waste clean up. Given the context, the correct 
word is most likely "hazmat," which sounds similar to "Tagget." 
5HEET is a gasoline additive. See R210:8; see also http://www.goldeagle.com/ 
heet/index.htm. 
6This brief refers to the minor victim by her first name. In so doing, the State does 
not intend to encourage this Court to depart from its current practice of identifying minors 
in court decisions by initials only. 
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In Albretsen's bedroom, police found methamphetamine, scales, packaging material, 
and a package of pseudoephedrine pills, which are commonly used in the production of 
methamphetamine. R58-60,65. This contraband was in an unsecured set of plastic drawers, 
about three feet high. R58. The sides of the drawers were transparent. R58. 
In defendamfs bedroom, police found a glass pipe wrapped in tissue paper on a closet 
shelf, just above the hanging rod. R57-58,62-63. The pipe, which had burn marks and white 
smoky residue inside, was like those commonly used to ingest meth. R57-58,67-68. Other 
than the tissue paper, nothing obscured the pipe from view, which sat uin the front of the 
closet." R58. Tiffany was tall enough to reach the pipe. R. 57-58. 
Magistrate's ruling 
The magistrate thought there "might be an issue" as to whether Tiffany had been 
exposed to the contraband in the house. But the magistrate thought "there is no question" 
that she was "exposed" within the meaning of the child endangerment statute based on "the 
officer's description of an 'overwhelming odor of a meth lab5 that he could smell even at the 
curb." R70. The magistrate noted that meth labs "have a very distinctive pungent smell" and 
that "if you have got a 13 year old living at that home even though the garage is detached 
there is no question in this Court's mind that that smell would be something that that child 
would be exposed to." R70. Considering the odor in conjunction with the drugs and 
paraphernalia found in the house, the magistrate found probable cause to believe that 
defendant had committed the crime of child endangerment. R70. 
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District court's ruling 
In denying defendant's motion to quash the bindover, the district court considered the 
items of contraband found in the house; Tiffany's mobility and apparent access to all portions 
of the home, including the rooms where the items were found; the meth lab debris in the 
garage; and the "overwhelming odor of a methamphetamine lab." R190-93. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The preliminary hearing evidence and its reasonable inferences were more 
than sufficient to raise a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly permitted her child to 
be exposed to controlled substances, chemical substances, or paraphernalia within the 
meaning of Utah's child endangerment statute. As this Court held in State v. Nieberger, the 
ordinary and accepted meaning of "expose to" is "'to place in a position where the [child] 
spoken of is open to danger, or where it is near or accessible to anything that may affect it 
detrimentally.'" 2006 UT App 5415 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 579 (6th ed. 1990)). 
Here, the defendant permitted her 13-year-old child to live in a home that was the site 
of methamphetamine manufacture, sales, and use. The child's home was surrounded by the 
"overwhelming" odor of a meth lab; debris from a meth lab, including substances used to 
manufacture meth, was found in the detached garage; methamphetamine, scales, packaging 
material, and pseudoephedrine was found in a three-foot tall transparent drawer in one adult 
resident's open bedroom; and a used meth glass pipe, wrapped in tissue paper, was found in 
defendant's closet, where her child could reach it. All this conduct amounted to placing a 
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child in a position where she was exposed to the serious dangers of controlled substances, 
chemical substances, or paraphernalia, as those items are defined by the statute. 
Taken together, the foregoing evidence and reasonable inferences support a 
reasonable belief that defendant knew methamphetamine was being manufactured, sold, and 
used on the premises: the odor of the meth lab was overwhelming; methamphetamine, 
scales, and packaging were in the house; and defendant possessed a used methamphetamine 
pipe, showing that she herself used the drug and, therefore, was likely tied to both the lab and 
the contraband. 
Point II: Defendant argues that the term "exposed to" in the child endangerment 
statute is unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied to her because it does not give 
fair warning of what is prohibited to persons of ordinary intelligence, and it creates a risk of 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Defendant does not have standing to facially 
challenge the child endangerment statute for vagueness, however, because she has not 
alleged or shown that the statute implicates any First Amendment or other constitutionally 
protected freedom. Defendant, therefore, is limited to challenging the statute as vague only 
as applied to her conduct. 
The ordinary and accepted meaning of "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a 
person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the statute prohibits defendant's 
conduct—exposing a child to the fumes of a meth lab and keeping drugs and paraphernalia 
in a place where the child could see and access them. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A 
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY 
EXPOSED HER CHILD TO CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, 
CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES, OR PARAPHERNALIA 
Defendant argues that the preliminary hearing evidence did not establish that she 
knowingly permitted her child to be exposed to controlled substances, chemical substances, 
or paraphernalia within the meaning of the child endangerment statute. She contends that 
her child was not "exposed" to any of the contraband because "the items were secreted in 
downstairs bedrooms occupied by adults or consisted only of'debris5 or an odor, and Tiffany 
was found alone in an upstairs living room away from these items." Br. Aplt. 9. She also 
argues that "the evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that the debris in the 
garage or the odor qualified as contraband under the statute." Br. Aplt. 9. She finally 
contends that the evidence does not show that she "knowingly" permitted her child to be 
exposed to the odor of the meth lab, where no evidence showed that she even knew what a 
meth lab smelled like or that it was coming from her garage. Br. Aplt. 23. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, a child is "exposed" to chemical substances within the 
plain meaning of the statute when an overwhelming odor of a meth lab surrounds the house 
where the child resides. Under this Court's decision in State v. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, 
ffi[ 17, 22, 128 P.3d 1223, cert denied, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006), a child is also exposed to 
drugs, chemical substances, and paraphernalia when she can both "see and potentially access 
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them." And, notwithstanding defendant's protestations, the evidence was more than 
sufficient to raise a reasonable belief that she "knowingly" permitted her child to be exposed 
to the chemical substances in the garage, where the smell was overwhelming, the garage was 
hers, and she possessed a used methamphetamine pipe, thereby showing her likely 
connection to the lab and other contraband in the house. 
A. Bindoveir standard* 
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a 
preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.5" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 
10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)) (additional 
internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This is the sole function of the preliminary 
hearing. Utah Const., art. I, § 12. "[T]o prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
must. . . produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001 
UT 9, |^ 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a 
bindover is "relatively low"—the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at ^[ 10, 
16. See also State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, % 18, 137 P.3d 787. Under both standards, the 
prosecution must only present '"sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief "that an 
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.'" Id. at f 20 (quoting 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16) (emphasis added). 
10 
In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant 
committed each element of the charged offense, u[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9 % 10 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted) (alternation in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, |^ 3,26 P.3d 223 
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution"). "[Wjhen faced with 
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave 
those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives rise to alternative reasonable inferences, 
the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the State's case. See id. at f 20 
(although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternate inferences—one suggesting 
innocence and the other guilt—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
evidence supported probable cause); see also Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ^ f 20 ("Although 
defendants' characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly inferred from the evidence, 
there are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate the 
reasonable inferences presented by the State"). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently confirmed that a magistrate's authority to evaluate 
credibility at the preliminary hearing stage "is limited to determining that 'evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim.5" Virgin, 2006 UT 29, % 24 (quoting State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 
438 (Utah 1998)). Thus, it is "inappropriate for a magistrate to weigh credible but 
11 
conflicting evidence at a preliminary hearing" because "a preliminary hearing 'is not a trial 
on the merits'" but only "'a gateway to the finder of fact."' Id. (quoting Talbot, 972 P.2d at 
438). 
B. "Expose to" as used in the child endangerment statute means to lay a child open 
to the prohibited substances and their inherent dangers. 
Defendant was charged under subsection (2) of Utah's Child or Elder Adult 
Endangerment Statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (West 2004). That subsection 
makes it third degree felony for any person to "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or permitf j 
a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled 
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1)." Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-112.5(2). 
The prosecution proceeded under the theory that defendant "exposed" her daughter 
to controlled substances, chemical substances, and drug paraphernalia. Thus, this case turns 
on the statutory meaning of "exposed to." 
The "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as 
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." 
Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ^ J 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). See also In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, ^ 8, 99 P.3d 793. This Court will 
"'presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term 
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, 
12 
Inc., 2001 UT 29, % 12,24 P.3d 928 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 
(Utah 1995)). 
This Court followed the foregoing principles in construing "exposed to" in Nieberger, 
another child endangerment prosecution. There, the Court recognized that the child 
endangerment statute "appears to represent the legislature's legitimate desire to protect the 
more vulnerable members of society from the dangers of drugs and related materials." State 
v. Nieberger, 2006 UTApp 5,^ f 14 n.5,128 P3d 1223. This Court then adopted the ordinary 
and accepted meaning of "exposed to" as found in the dictionary. The Court first turned to 
Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "expose" as "[t]o show publicly, to display" and 
[tjo place in a position where the object spoken of is open to danger, or where 
it is near or accessible to anything that may affect it detrimentally, as to 
'expose' a child, or to expose oneself or another to a contagious disease or to 
danger or hazard of any kind. 
Id. at f^ 15 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed. 1990) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, placing a child where she is "open to danger" 
or where she "is near or accessible to anything that may affect [her] detrimentally" is 
"exposing" her to that thing or danger. 
Lay dictionaries similarly define "expose" as "'to . . . subject to risk from a harmful 
action or condition,' 'to submit or make accessible to a particular action or influence,' and 
cto cause to be visible or open to view.'" Id. (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 410 (10th ed. 1993)). One electronic dictionary, not quoted in Nieberger, simply 
sums up "expose" as "to lay open to danger, attack, harm," or "something specified." http:// 
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dictionary.reference.com/browse/expose. Thus, applied in the context of the child 
endangerment statute, exposing a child merely means to lay that child open to controlled 
substances, chemical substances, or paraphernalia, with their inherent dangers. 
The Nieberger court held that exposing a child to controlled substances and 
paraphernalia included keeping illegal drugs and paraphernalia where children could "see 
and potentially access" them. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, f 17. This is because, as the 
Nieberger court rightly understood, leaving illegal drugs and paraphernalia where a child 
could see and access them is laying that child open to, or placing her in a position where she 
is open to, those items and their inherent dangers. This interpretation of the statutory term 
falls squarely within the statutory intent of "protecting] the more vulnerable members of 
society from the dangers of drugs and related materials/' Id. at f^ 14, n.5. If that is the aim 
of the statute, the plain, ordinary meaning of "expose to" necessarily contemplates that adults 
keep these dangerous substances in a secure place where the children are unlikely to see or 
be able to access them. 
But leaving contraband where a child could see and potentially access it is not the only 
way in which a child may be "exposed" to these substances. As Nieberger recognized, the 
statutory term "expose" is very broad, covering "a wide range of behaviors and 
circumstances, some of which might otherwise seem innocuous." Id, at \ 14 n.5. For 
example, an adult may expose or lay a child open to controlled substances by smoking 
marijuana, snorting cocaine, or injecting heroin in the child's presence. Or a parent may 
expose her child to the fumes and other attendant dangers of chemical substances by allowing 
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a methamphetamine lab to operate on the premises. The toxic by-products used during 
methamphetamine production can contaminate surfaces, drains, sinks, ventilation systems, 
couches, carpets, and beds, "can persist in soil and groundwater for years"; and even in small 
amounts can pose serious health risks. "Methamphetamine Frequently Asked Questions," 
available at http://www.kci.org/meth_info/faq_meth.htm; "Cleaning up Former 
Methamphetamine Labs," available at http://www.kci.org/ meth_info/meth_cleanup.htm; 
"Guidelines for Cleaning Up Former Methamphetamine Labs," available at 
http://www.deq.state.ok.us/LPDnew/MethLabs/meth.htm. Exposure to these chemicals and 
their by-products can cause respiratory problems; skin, eye, nose, and throat irritation; 
headaches; nausea; dizziness; vomiting; severe eye damage; decreased mental function; 
anemia; kidney damage; birth defects; chest pain; lack of coordination; chemical burns; 
cancer; and even death. "Cleaning Up Former Methamphetamine Labs," available at 
http ://www.kci .or g/meth info/methcleanup .htm; Karen Swetlow, "Children at Clandestine 
Methamphetamine Labs: Helping Meth's Youngest Victims," available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/welcome.html; "Dangers to 
Children Living at Meth Labs," available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/ 
bulletins/children/pg5.html; see also Illinois Department of Public Health, 
"Methamphetamine Laboratories and Cleanup," available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/ 
envhealth/factsheets/meth-labs.htm. Thus, while a child may not be able to see or access a 
meth lab, she is certainly exposed to it within the meaning of the statute if it has been 
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operating on the premises on which she lives, because she is laid open to the serious dangers 
created by the lab. 
In sum, "exposing" a child to controlled substances, chemical substances, or 
paraphernalia means to place the child "in a position where [she] is open to" those substances 
and their inherent risks. This includes storing contraband in a place accessible to children, 
or any other conduct that lays a child open to "the dangers of drugs and related materials." 
Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, \ 14 n.5. As this Court recognized in Nieberger, this is a fact-
intensive question that will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Id.. 
C. The plain language of the statute does not require the State to prove that the 
exposure to the prohibited substances presented an actual risk of harm. 
Defendant argues, as did Nieberger, that the child endangerment statute must be 
interpreted to require some risk of harm to the child. Br. Aplt. 11. As defendant 
acknowledges, however, Nieberger squarely rejected her argument. See Br. Aplt. 10,11 n.2; 
Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ffif 13-14. 
Before 2002, the child endangerment statute required a showing of risk of actual harm 
because it expressly "prohibited placing protected persons 'at risk of suffering bodily injury, 
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury from exposure to, ingestion or inhalation 
of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.5" Id. 
at H 13 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (Supp. 2000)). But in 2002, "the legislature 
amended the statute to its current form, removing the risk element and replacing it with 
'causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have 
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contact with' the enumerated materials." Id, (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003)). 
The Nieberger court thus explained, ucThe omission of the element in the revised statute 
logically can mean nothing but that the legislature's purpose deliberately was to remove 
[risk] as an element of the offense.'" Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, f 14 (quoting State v. 
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983)) (alteration in Nieberger). 
The statute's current structure confirms Nieberger's conclusion that the Legislature 
intended to prohibit exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact, without more. While 
subsection (2) of the statute no longer requires a showing of risk or actual harm, subsection 
(3) does. Subsection (3) enhances the penalty to a second degree felony if a child actually 
"suffers bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, 
ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(3). That subsection further enhances the 
penalty to a first degree felony if the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in 
death. Id. In the face of subsection (2)'s omission, subsection (3)'s enhancements serve as 
further compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend to require that exposure be 
read to require an actual risk of harm. This Court thus rightly held that uthe legislature's 
express deletion of a risk element precluded] [the Court] from writing such an element back 
into the statute." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^  14. 
Defendant presents no basis for concluding that Nieberger was wrong on this point. 
Nor does she present any basis for overruling Nieberger. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
398-99 & n.3 (Utah 1994) (those asking "to overturn prior precedent have a substantial 
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burden of persuasion" due to "the doctrine of stare decisis"; a court of appeals panel may 
overrule its own decision only where "conditions have changed so as to render the prior 
decision inapplicable"). 
Defendant nevertheless contends that risk or danger is inherent in the definition of 
"expose" embraced by this Court in Nieberger. Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant is partially correct. 
As illustrated by the above dictionary definitions and their application in Nieberger, exposing 
a child to illegal drugs, chemical substances, or paraphernalia amounts to laying a child open 
to a risk of, or even an actual, danger. But that does not mean that the Legislature intended 
to required the State to prove such a risk. To the contrary, the 2002 amendments demonstrate 
that this was not the Legislature's intent. Implicit in the amendments, however, is a 
legislative finding that exposing a child to the prohibited items presents an inherent risk of 
danger or haim. This is supported by the legislative debates on the 2002 amendments, on 
which defendant relies and attaches in Addendum E of her brief.7 
7Ordinarily, a court should not resort to legislative history when, as here, the 
statute is unambiguous. See Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist, 2002 UT 130, ^ J 58, 63 
P.3d 705 (Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting with two justices concurring); see also 
O'keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term 
"overtime" is clear and unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other 
methods of construction"); Visitor Info. Cntr. Autk v. Customer Service Div., 930 P.2d 
1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find 
no need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history"). But in this case, the floor 
debates demonstrate that the Legislature has determined that exposing children and elder 
adults to the items prohibited in the statute poses an inherent risk of danger, which the 
State is not required to prove. Thus, the floor debates support the plain meaning of the 
statute. 
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In introducing the 2002 amendments to the House, Representative Beck explained that 
instead of requiring a showing of "risk," the original statute "should have simply made it 
illegal to expose [children and elder adults] to a non-prescribed controlled substance." R95. 
Representative Beck elaborated that exposure to such substances created an inherent risk of 
harm: "Obviously they have already determined that the controlled substances are risky to 
an individual's health, otherwise they would not be a controlled substance. The same is true 
with the drug paraphernalia and chemicals used to making illegal drugs." Id. Representative 
Beck further explained that the "current language unintentionally requires the prosecutor to 
present scientific evidence to show that the controlled substances are dangerous." Id. That, 
according to the representative, is "not only expensive but it's also ridiculous to spend all 
their time trying to show that." Id. 
Senator Julander, in presenting the amendment to the Senate, similarly expressed that 
exposure to contraband in violation of the statute presents an inherent risk to children and 
elder adults. "Obviously," she explained, "we've already determined that controlled 
substances are risky to an individual's health." Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th 
Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 40, March 1,2002, Tape 46 (transcribed 
by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney General's Office) (attached in 
Addendum).8 Thus, she stated, the "current [pre-2002] language unintentionally requires 
8Although defendant has attached transcripts of the House floor debates, she has 
attached only a partial transcript of the Senate floor debates on the amendment. For the 
Court's convenience, the State has supplied a transcript of the rest of the Senate debates 
at Addendum. 
19 
a prosecutor to present specific evidence to show that controlled substances are dangerous." 
Id.9 (Emphasis added). 
In sum, under the plain language of the child endangerment statute, the State need not 
make an independent showing of risk of actual harm or danger. Rather, the Legislature has 
already determined that exposure to the prohibited substances, without more, carries an 
inherent risk of harm or danger. Thus, as Nieberger held, the State need only prove exposure 
to the prohibited items. 
D. The preliminary hearing evidence established a reasonable belief that defendant 
knowingly exposed her child to controlled and chemical substances and 
paraphernalia. 
The question, then, is whether the evidence at preliminary hearing was sufficient to 
create a reasonable belief that defendant "knowingly or intentionally cause[d] or permitted]" 
her 13-year-old daughter "to be exposed to . . . a controlled substance, chemical substance, 
or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). 
Subsection (1) defines "chemical substance" as "a substance intended to be used as a 
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical intended to be 
used in the manufacture of a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(a). 
9Senator Valentine initially objected to the amendment because he believed that 
dropping the "at risk" language would criminalize the innocent possession of two or more 
precursors in a house where children were present. Id. Senator Valentine's concern was 
resolved, however, not by leaving the "at risk" language in, but by requiring that 
possession of any precursors be with the intent to manufacture illegal drugs. Recording 
of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 43, 
March 4, 2002, Tape 49 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney 
General's Office) (attached at Addendum). See also 2002 Laws of Utah, ch. 32. 
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"Intent under this subsection may be demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner 
of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to manufacturing equipment." Id. 
Controlled substances under the statute include methamphetamine. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(c); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(f)(i); & Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii)(j). Drug paraphernalia include scales used for weighing a controlled substance, 
equipment used or intended for use to ingest or inhale a controlled substance, and materials 
used to package a controlled substance. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(d) & Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-3. 
The prosecution presented two theories of exposure at the preliminary hearing: 
defendant knowingly "exposed" her 13 -year-old daughter to (1) the chemical substances used 
in the manufacture of methamphetamine, as evidenced by meth lab debris in the garage and 
the overwhelming odor surrounding the house; and (2) the methamphetamine, chemical 
substance (pseudoephedrine), and paraphernalia found in the house. The preliminary hearing 
and its reasonable inferences support both theories. 
1. Defendant knowingly permitted her child to be exposed to chemical 
substances where an overwhelming odor of a meth lab, emanating from 
the garage, surrounded the house where they lived. 
When the preliminary hearing evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to, and 
all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of, the prosecution, there can be no doubt that 
defendant knowingly exposed or laid her 13-year-old daughter open to chemical substances 
as defined by the statute. 
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First, the testimony supports a reasonable belief that Tiffany was exposed to a 
chemical substance. The testimony was uncontroverted that an "overwhelming" smell of a 
meth lab surrounded the house where Tiffany lived. R59. The smell was so strong and 
pervasive that Detective Wester could smell it from the curb and in the back yard. Id. The 
apparent source of the smell came from the detached garage where the officers found debris 
from a meth lab. RR59-60. Although the operating meth lab was no longer there, its odor 
remained and pervaded the premises. While defendant asserts that there was no evidence that 
Tiffany ever smelled the odor, Br. Aplt. 20,24, the reasonable inferences from the testimony 
suggest otherwise. Given that the overwhelming odor surrounded the house, it is reasonable 
to infer that Tiffany smelled it some time, either while in the house or at some point when 
she had to leave the house. But even if Tiffany never actually "smelled" the odor, a 
reasonable inference is that she was nevertheless "exposed to" it because of its pervasiveness 
in the air. 
Defendant argues that the State did not "establish probable cause to believe that the 
debris in the garage or the odor qualified as a chemical substance, controlled substance or 
paraphernalia under the child endangerment statute." Br. Aplt. 23. She contends that the 
debris found in the garage only "consisted of empty bottles of HEET, black electrical tape, 
stained rubber gloves and an odor that the officer characterized as the odor of a 
methamphetamine lab," and that "none" of these items falls within the statutory definition 
of a chemical substance. Id. 
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As a preliminary matter, this Court should not address this issue because defendant 
did not raise it below, nor has she argued any exception to the preservation rule. See State 
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to address unpreserved claim in 
interlocutory appeal from bindover, where defendant argued no exception to preservation 
rule); see also State v. Briggs, 2006 UT App 448, IfiJ 4-5,147 P.3d 369. She challenged the 
bindover only on the grounds that Tiffany was not exposed to the contraband, that defendant 
did not "knowingly" expose her to any contraband, and that there was no evidence that the 
debris in the garage came from a meth lab. See R68-69, R36-49, Rl 60-62. Defendant never 
argued, as she does now, that none of the items fell within the statutory definition of a 
chemical substance. 
In any event, the preliminary hearing evidence amply demonstrated probable cause 
that the odor pervading the premises was a direct result of chemical substances as defined 
by the statute. A "chemical substance" is any "substance intended to be used as a precursor 
in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical intended to be used in 
the manufacture of a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(a). Intent may 
be demonstrated by the "substance's use, quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other 
precursors, or to manufacturing equipment." Id. Controlled substance precursors include 
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and red phosphorous. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(2). 
Here, Detective Wester, who had received training in narcotics and meth labs, testified 
that the overwhelming odor was that of a meth lab. R53-54, 59. His identification of the 
odor was confirmed by the discovery of HEET, black tape, and stained rubber gloves in the 
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garage. Detective Wester testified that HEET is used to break up ephedrine and red 
phosphorous, both precursors to the manufacture of methamphetamine. R59. He also 
testified that black tape is used to connect pipes for a meth lab and that they did not test or 
take the rubber gloves into evidence because the officers believed they were stained with 
toxic by-products of methamphetamine. R59-60, 65, 67. The officers then found 
pseudoephedrine, methamphetamine, scales, baggies, and a meth pipe in the house. R56-58. 
These facts, taken together give rise to a reasonable inference that the overwhelming odor 
was created by the combination of chemical substances in a meth lab in the garage. 
Consequently, Tiffany was exposed to a chemical substance within the meaning of the 
statute.10 
10Relying on State v. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, f 10, 128 P.3d 1220, defendant 
asserts that the State could establish that the odor qualified as a chemical substance only 
through expert testimony and that the State produced no such testimony. Br. Aplt. 24. 
This argument is unpreserved and should be disregarded. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229. 
In any event, the State did produce expert testimony through Detective Wester that the 
odor came from a meth lab. R59. Detective Wester testified that he had training in meth 
labs. R53-54. He therefore qualified as an expert under Rule 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. See Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, (Utah 1993) (police officer qualified as 
expert in accident reconstruction "by virtue of his 'experience [or] training"' (quoting 
Utah R. Evid. 702)). As explained, a reasonable inference from that testimony was that 
the odor came from chemical substances emanating from the garage. 
Defendant nevertheless suggests, again for the first time on appeal, that Detective 
Wester's experience was minimal, rendering his identification of the odor suspect. Br. 
Aplt. 26. In support, she cites to a web cite for the proposition that "there are four 
possible smells, some of which might appear similar to the smells found in ordinary 
garages, which are associated with meth labs." Br. Aplt. 26. Even assuming that this 
claim was preserved and that other smells are similar to that of a meth lab, that does not 
help defendant The detective's uncontroverted testimony was that the smell belonged to 
a meth lab. His testimony was supported by the discovery of chemicals, precursors, 
equipment, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia on the premises. Thus, even assuming 
that it was reasonable to believe that the detective was mistaken, that, at most, only raised 
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Defendant next argues that the State failed to show a reasonable belief that she 
"knowingly" permitted Tiffany to be exposed to the odor of the methamphetamine lab. She 
asserts that nothing suggests that she "was aware of the debris in the detached garage or the 
odor outside or had knowledge that the debris in the garage qualified as contraband under 
the child endangerment statute." Br. Apt. 22-23. She also claims that nothing showed "that 
had she been aware of the odor, she would have known that it was caused by a 
methamphetamine lab or that the odor emanated from the garage rather than a neighbor's 
house or car." Id. at 23. 
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, however, is that 
defendant did smell the odor, which according to the uncontroverted testimony, was 
"overwhelming" and could be sensed from the curb and backyard of the house. Another 
reasonable inference is that defendant knew that the odor came from a meth lab in her garage 
and not from somewhere else in the neighborhood. First, the contraband found in 
Albretson's bedroom suggests that methamphetamine was not only being produced on the 
premises, but it was also being sold on the premises, two facts that would be difficult to hide 
from other residents, such as defendant. That defendant was aware of these activities is 
further supported by the presence of a used methamphetamine pipe in her closet. This 
an alternative inference. When conflicting evidence or inferences are presented at a 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate is bound to draw those in favor of the prosecution. 
See Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 10; Hawatmeh,2Q0l UT 51, ffi[ 3, 20. 
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suggests that she herself was a methamphetamine user and therefore likely to have been well 
aware of the manufacture and sale of the drug at her residence. 
In short, the preliminary hearing evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant 
was fully aware that there had been an operating meth lab in her garage and that the fumes 
still lingered. Yet, she permitted her child to live there and be exposed to the dangers of 
those fumes. 
2. Defendant knowingly permitted her child to be exposed to 
controlled substances and paraphernalia where those items were 
kept where the child could both see and potentially access them. 
The preliminary hearing evidence also supports a reasonable belief regarding the 
prosecution's second theory—that defendant knowingly permitted her child to be exposed 
to illegal drugs and paraphernalia, where those items were kept in places where the child 
could both see and potentially access them. 
This theory is governed by Nieberger. As stated, Nieberger held that a parent permits 
her child to be exposed to controlled substances or paraphernalia where those items are kept 
in a place where the child can both "see and potentially access" them. Nieberger, 2006 UT 
App 5, % 17. Nieberger had two children, ages two and three, who resided with hen Id. at 
f^ 2. Nieberger told police that her husband had been selling marijuana for five years and that 
she herself occasionally used marijuana. Id. Nieberger kept her personal supply of 
marijuana and paraphernalia on the living room entertainment center, on a shelf five to six 
feet off the ground. Id. Police found other controlled substances and paraphernalia in 
Nieberger"'s house, including "several ounces of marijuana in a cabinet above the kitchen 
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counter, a metal pipe with marijuana residue in a kitchen drawer, a Valium pill in a baggie 
on the kitchen counter, a bong sitting on the television stand in the basement, and a broken 
bong on the floor of the master bedroom closet." Id. at % 3. 
Observing that Nieberger kept her marijuana and pipe "in plain view" in the living 
room, this Court further noted that there was "nothing to suggest" that her two- and three-
year-old children "lacked the ordinary mobility, perception, or curiosity that could be 
expected of children that age." Id. at f 12. Nor did the record suggest "that the children were 
in any way restricted from accessing the rooms where the various items were found." Id. 
This Court thus concluded that the factual circumstances in that case supported "a 
reasonable inference that the Nieberger home was a frequent site for the use and sale of 
marijuana, and that Nieberger's children were not isolated from that lifestyle." Id. at ^ j 22. 
Moreover, "the evidence suggested] that items of contraband were kept around the house 
in various places that were visible and accessible to the children, and that Nieberger 
knowingly permitted this to occur." Id. In other words, "Nieberger's alleged acts of 
allowing her children to see and potentially access controlled substances and paraphernalia 
[fell] squarely within [the child endangerment] statute's purview." Id. at \ 17 (emphasis 
added). Significantly, Court reached this holding even though many of the items in 
Nieberger were not in plain view or easily accessible to her small children. Rather, the 
contraband was only "potentially" accessible. Thus, Nieberger teaches that a person exposes 
a child to a controlled substance when she intentionally and knowingly leaves it in a place 
where a child can "see and potentially access" it. Id. 
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But "[wjhether any particular minor or elder adult has the ability to see and access a 
particular object is a factual matter that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account the circumstances of the alleged exposure and the victim's physical abilities." Id. 
at f 12 n.3. The circumstances here, while not identical to Nieberger, are similar and support 
a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly exposed or laid her 13-year-old daughter open 
to the drugs and paraphernalia found in both defendant's and Albretson's rooms. 
As detailed above, defendant's home was the site for the manufacture, sale, and use 
of methamphetamine. The overwhelming odor of the meth lab and evidence that meth was 
being sold from the home raises a reasonable inference that Tiffany "w[as] not isolated from 
that lifestyle." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, J^ 22. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that Tiffany 
could have been unaware of the illegal activities in her home. 
In addition, the items of contraband found in the house were where Tiffany could both 
"see and potentially access" them. Meth, scales, and packaging were kept in a three-foot-tall 
transparent drawer in Albretson's closet. While these items were housed in Albretson's 
bedroom, nothing protected Tiffany from finding, seeing, and accessing them. As in 
Nieberger, nothing in the record suggests "that the [child was] in any way restricted from 
accessing the rooms where the various items were found." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,^12. 
Indeed, according to the detective, all the doors in the house were open. Defendant's meth 
pipe was slightly more hidden, but still lay toward the front of a closet shelf that Tiffany 
could reach. Under Nieberger, it does not matter whether Tiffany in fact saw these items. 
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Rather, their storage in a place that was both in view and readily accessible to her put 
Tiffany in position where she was laid open to or exposed to these dangerous items. 
Defendant again asserts that no evidence showed that she was aware of the items or 
their storage in Albretson's room. Br. Aplt 22, 27. But, as explained above, the 
circumstances taken as a whole support a reasonable inference that defendant was well aware 
of the illegal activities in her home. Yet she took no steps to protect Tiffany from being 
exposed to them. The doors to defendant's and Albretson's bedrooms were open and most 
of the contraband was kept in a transparent, unsecured drawer. Defendant's own meth pipe 
was kept on a shelf that Tiffany could reach. 
Viewing the evidence and its logical inferences in the light most favorable to the 
State, Tiffany could both see and potentially access all the contraband in the house. She was 
therefore "exposed to" those items within the plain meaning of the child endangerment 
statute. The district court, therefore, properly denied the motion to quash the bindover. 
POINT II 
UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT 
BECAUSE HER CONDUCT FELL SQUARELY WITHIN THE 
PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE 
Defendant challenges the child endangerment statute as unconstitutionally vague, both 
facially and as applied to her. Br. Aplt. 28-29. As this Court held in Nieberger, defendant 
does not have standing to facially challenge the child endangerment statute for vagueness 
because she has not alleged, much less shown, that it implicates any First Amendment or 
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other constitutionally protected freedom. 2006 UT App 5, f 11 n.2. She is therefore limited 
to challenging the statute as vague as applied only to her. 
Defendant has not shown that the statute is vague as applied to her because, read in 
context, the term "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a person of ordinary intelligence 
on notice that the statute prohibits knowingly permitting a child to live on premises where 
the manufacture, sale, and use of methamphetamine is occurring, particularly where the 
overwhelming odor of a meth lab surrounds the home. Moreover, as Nieberger held, a 
person of ordinary intelligence would also understand that the statute prohibits leaving illegal 
drugs and paraphernalia in a place where the child could both see and potentially access 
them. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, f 17. 
A. Defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a law as applied to the 
hypothetical conduct of others. 
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define the offense 
"'with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited 
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State 
v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f 43, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983)). A statute need not define an offense with "mathematical certainty," however. 
Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,110 (1972). Statutes may use terms "marked by 
'flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity/" as long as " it is clear 
what the ordinance as a whole prohibits." Id. (quoting Esteban v. Cent. Missouri State 
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)). 
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Vagueness challenges "'which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be 
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, f 44 (quoting 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7 
(1982)). Absent a First Amendment or other constitutional violation, "a court will uphold 
a facial vagueness challenge 'only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications."' State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, % 12, 84 P.3d 1171 (emphasis added). "A 
statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness 
challenge." Id. Thus, "a court should 'examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing 
other hypothetical applications of the law' when a challenged statute 'implicates no 
constitutionally protected conduct.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, % 44 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S. 
at 494-95). 
Here, defendant's conduct—letting her child live in a home where methamphetamine 
is being manufactured, sold, and used—does not involve a constitutionally protected right. 
Defendant can only prevail, therefore, if she can show that the statute is vague as applied to 
her conduct.11 
11
 Even if defendant could bring a facial challenge to the statute, it would fail. As 
stated, a statute is facially vague "only if [it] is impermissibly vague in all its applications. 
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, J^ 12 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Defendant cannot make this showing here, because this Court held in 
Nieberger that the statute was not vague as applied to those circumstances. Nieberger, 
2006 UT App 5, Xh 14-17. A fortiorari, the statute is not vague in all of its applications. 
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To prevail on her vague-as-applied challenge, defendant must show "either (1) that 
the statutef] do[es] not provide 'the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand 
what conduct [is prohibited]/ or (2) that the statute[] *encourage[s] arbitrary and 
discriminator/ enforcement/" MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 13 (citations omitted). In other 
words, the question is whether defendant was on notice that "her alleged actions might 
violate the statute." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, <[} 15 (citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc., v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (noting the "one who deliberately goes perilously 
close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line")). 
B. As used in the child endangerment statute, the term "expose to" is sufficiently 
definite to put defendant on notice that her conduct was prohibited. 
A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that the child endangerment 
statute prohibited defendant's conduct. Defendant permitted her child to live in a home 
where methamphetamine was manufactured, sold, and used. The house was surrounded by 
the overwhelming odor of a meth lab that had been operating in the garage. Indeed, allowing 
her daughter to be exposed to the fumes of a meth lab falls squarely within the purview of 
the statute. In addition, according to Nieberger, a defendant's "alleged acts of allowing her 
children to see and potentially access controlled substances and paraphernalia [also] falls 
squarely within the statute's purview." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, %\ 14-15. Because 
Nieberger's alleged acts fell "squarely" within the statute's purview," the Nieberger court 
concluded that there was "no room for law enforcement officials to decide, in their 
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discretion, that the statute's provisions should not apply." Id. at f 17. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that this Court's decisions in Nieberger and Draper 
"do not sufficiently define the term "exposed to" so as to guide law enforcement as to what 
is required in order to expose a child to a controlled substance." Br. Aplt. 31. Defendant, 
like Nieberger and Draper, continues to assert that the statute is vague and encourages 
arbitrary enforcement so long as it is not interpreted to require an actual risk of harm. To 
support this claim, defendant relies on three out-of-state decisions, State v. Downey, 476 
N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985), Commonwealth v. Carter, 462 S.R2d 582 (Va. Ct App. 1995), and 
State v. Scruggs, 905 A.2d 24 (Conn. 2006). None of these cases is helpful, however, 
because they construed statutes completely different from the one at issue here. 
The statute in Downey prohibited a "person having the care, custody or control of a 
dependent" from "knowingly or intentionally [placing] the dependent in a situation that may 
endanger his life or health." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122. The Downey court held that the 
statute, construed literally, criminalized exposing a dependent "to the risk of a risk of harm." 
Id. at 123. Thus, "it would be a crime to raise a child in a high-rise apartment or to mop the 
kitchen floor with a bucket of water in the presence of a small child." Id. This literal 
construction, the Downey court said, had "a broadness and vagueness which would prevent 
it from meeting constitutional muster." Id. To avoid this constitutional infirmity, Downey 
read the statute to require that the "placement must itself expose the dependent to a danger 
which is actual and appreciable/' Id. 
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Carter interpreted a similar statute, which prohibited a child's custodian from 
"willfully or negligently" permitting the child "to be placed in a situation that its life, health 
or morals may be endangered " Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 584 (emphasis added). The Carter 
court concluded that "[b]y using the term 'may/ the legislature criminalize[d] any act which 
presented] a 'possibility5 of physical or moral harm to the child." Id. at 585 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, Carter found this provision of the statute to be unconstitutionally 
vague. Id. 
Scruggs likewise involved a statute that prohibited a risk of harm to the child. That 
statute prohibited "wilfully or unlawfully" causing or permitting a child under sixteen "to be 
placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such 
child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired . . . ." 
Scruggs, 905 A.2d at 26. Scruggs's 12-year-old son committed suicide by hanging himself 
in his bedroom closet. Id. The boy had been "bullied relentlessly at school" and "frequently 
exhibited poor hygiene and occasionally defecated in his pants." Id. The condition of his 
apartment when he hung himself was "extremely cluttered and... it had an unpleasant odor." 
Id. at 27. The boy's mother was prosecuted on the ground that she should have known that 
the condition of her home placed her child in a position where his mental health was likely 
to be impaired. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the statute was vague as applied 
to Scruggs's conduct because a person of ordinary intelligence would not have been on 
notice "that the conditions in her apartment posed an unlawful risk to the mental health of 
a child." Id at 36. 
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. Thus, the statutes in nownevt (\irf> "\ and !niruggs were not,, as defendant suggests, 
unconstitutionally vague because they did nol require ;i 'qgnifieaitl i isk of harm, i hey were 
unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would he; uritbl," !,\ fell 
v "• • • : -\- au iiust a\oivi. HI in the case ofiScrwgg5, that her specific conduct created-
a risk of harm. 
In contrast, Utah's child endangers a -a \^r- • • : - .,K iai m u ;>eeks to present: 
permitting children to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, oi to have »^» • *j , -gs 
i paiaphenuh'j No one is left to guess what risk of harm must be avoided. Ratlici "; 
statute spells it c •- • ; ••- •• -.
 v VJS kbv>v\ i ugly expose their children to ilkgal 
drugs, chemical substances, or paraphem '-• , 
1, II innately, defendant's claim., that the statute is unconstitm« • *' - ue 
(henry - • • \posuic lo illegal drugs or paraphernalia does nol create a risk of harm -
as the child dor- j • :; • rnue.ee i.,.ialo, or otherwise have contact with the drag. 
But, as explained in Point l.C . the I,egi>.ia» e '* r a^ * -i-u I:\A\K-\ u:> evidenced by the 
statute's plain language and legislative history—that exposure a'-- I : ;ae. ; >. < i. us 
,,:., A\ r... 11Jis legislative determination is not without support Accord*- e 
toastudxh* ih * K :- ",,,!'s -. "*.id-t ••:•:. :ui substance Abuse at Columbia University, 
"[c]hildreh »l illu.il drug abusers are hki-f.i * • . .• iiuu drug abusers to 
demonstrate immature, impulsive or irresponsible behavior, • M »• *-. .; r 
;•.} -.a- h« in .-»CIH^I uiid to have behavioral problems, depression and anxiety - -all -h.!-;> »t" 
risk for suh^fanee abie«,e "" I ASA V\ line rapei-, ramily Matters: Substance Abuse and The 
American Family,, The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia 
University 12 (March 2005), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org (follow 
"Publications", then follow "Annual Reports"). "Children of drug abusing parents, 
particularly drug-abusing mothers, are [also] more likely to be disobedient, aggressive, 
withdrawn and detached. These children also tend to have fewer friends, lower confidence 
in their ability to make friends and a greater likelihood of being avoided by their peers." Id. 
According to this study, these children are also at a heightened risk of being abused or 
neglected. Id. at 20. But the risks to a child's physical well-being are even higher, when, as 
here, the child has been exposed to the toxic chemicals and by-products of a meth lab. See 
Point I.C. 
In short, exposing a child to illegal drugs and paraphernalia creates an inherent risk 
of harm. The term "expose to," therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the 
statute does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm. Rather, the question is 
whether the statute would place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that defendant's 
conduct is prohibited. As explained above, the answer is clearly "yes." Moreover, law 
enforcement, prosecutors, and judges would not be left to guess whether the statute applies 
to these circumstances—exposing a child to the fumes of a meth lab and keeping drugs and 
paraphernalia in a place where the child can both see and access them. 
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Based on the foregoing, the State respectful! \ t4> - * ^ district 
- i dciuiUant's motion to quash the bindo\ or on t IKJ - hild endangerme •; - t. 
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ADDENDUM 
Senate Floor Debates on 2002 Amendment 
t( "h ild Endangerment Statute 
Senate Debate on HB 125 ' ' March 1, 2002 
54*. Leg. General Session, Day 40 Tape 46 
Mr. President- I < f , nrxl yd !u liou >t lull I " •< 
; House bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with contra M?d -. K? IT-:, 
precursor, by representative (Inaudible) Senator Joe Lander. 
Mr. President: Senator Julander 
Senator Julanden There were two over sights dealing in the section dealing with a ch. id 
» br adult in 76-5-112.5. We will correct those two problems with this bill. The lirst 
iem is that the section contains an awkward (inaudible) requirement. Obviously 
re already determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health. 
The current language unintentionally requires a prosecutor to present specific'evidence to 
• s\ that controlled substances are dangerous. This is not only expensive it's rather 
IOUS. The other oversight in this section is that it contains no exceptions for" di\ 
TTxxxv:ti are administered in accordance with a prescription from a physician; this, bill also 
fixes that problem. This bill was requested by the State Wide Association of Prosecutors 
and supported by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice and (inaudible) 
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance 
Abuse Anti-Violence Counsel It passed unanimously in. all committees and on the house 
floor 
Mr. President: Senator Valentine? 
Senator Valentine; Thank you.Mr. President. This bill (inaud" ^ 
Senator Julander: I can't hear him, 
Mr, President: Try him again; let's see if it'll turn on (inaudible) again. Oh that's better. 
Senator Valentine: I don't "'think, "that it was <m . nu ^p. ^ 27, 28, and 
29,1 remember the debate on this, and I rememi _L mat this w mc elements of a 
different crime; So that we have a different crime, of being e> ^ i addition to the 
possession or the obvious crime of having the drug paraphernalia, the drugs themselves, 
urn, of having urn, a meth. Lab, but the additional crime in addition to the, the uiiderlymg 
crime was this exposure, and so by deleting out 27, 28, and 29 you now make it an 
automatic crime. So that if the drug paraphernalia is in the same house someplace as the 
child, but all of the sudden now you have two crimes that have been committed. And we 
talked about that very thing, and we argued back and forth about that and we finally 
decided that we wanted to have that felony crime, that enhanced crime there when you 
had to prove one additional element, and the element was, the very things you're 
dropping out. Can you tell me now why we will have-K\ o rrimes for one action, by 
dropping that out? Why that's good policy? 
1 
Senator Julander: (There's still two crimes) I, if I understand your question, there's still 
two crimes, but you don't. But, but if you look at line 17, it already defines the chemical 
substance. 
Senator Valenline: Yea, that's the chemical substance, but if it's someplace in the 
dwelling, maybe even totally removed from where the children can get to, you're saying 
now it's a second crime because you've dropped out, you make it an automatic second 
crime. You dropped out the exposure provision, which was the provision that we 
negotiated to put in as the second element of the crime. 
Senator Julander: But if you, uh if they have to be exposed to it if you look in 33-32 they 
have to exposed to it or ingest it. 
Senator Valentine: But aren't you dropping out in the previous lines the exposure? Cause 
you're saying unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally cause or permits a child or elder adult to be, and then you 
have the language you're dropping out, which is the 'at risk' language. Isn't that 
dropping out the exposure? 
Senator Julander: But look on 29 it's exposed to, to ingest or inhale. 
Senator Valentine: Obviously if you're dealing drugs to a kid, then that one is covered by 
three. 
Senator Julander: Excuse me? 
Senator Valentine: If you're dealing drugs to a child then that one is covered by 
paragraph three, and that's very obvious. I mean, and that should be an enhanced penalty. 
It's just the exposure of it being in the premises that I'm worried about. (Murmurs) See 
one of the problems is that if you have it just to the list of precursors on line 17 as you 
originally talked about, there are some things on those Hst of precursors that are in a lot of 
houses, probably your house. I could probably find some of those items; uh for example, 
uh some of those items in smaller quantities are in your medicine cabinet. But you need 
to be able to show exposure to those items, so that you cannot have a crime. I mean, that 
bothers me 1hat you'd have a crime just because it's in the house. Let me give you one 
example, ephedrine, that in over the counter medications for decongestant, that's 
probably in medicine cabinet some place. Does that mean you committed a crime 
because you're grandchildren are in the same house as you are? That's wh, that's what's 
worrying me. 
Mr. President: Senator Julander? 
Senator Julander: I really think this is a policy question, and I would like to get more 
information, and get to you and circle the bill at the proper time. 
Mr. President: Thank you I wry: er>in * u> u ^ •* « .
 s 5 . w aillj then we A 
get back to i t 
OCL :HM . .-ij ;L-I ..,.,
 rwt L-a^ i\ M aii you* T \v~-_ild like to circle the bill,. 
Senator Valentine: And. senator thank you. \ur niu^i., • i--. . in_>c rnings are coming 
up pretty fast and I didn't get' to talk to you in advance. . 
Senator Lander: J hat's okay. That's okay; we'll clear it up* 
Senator Valentine: Thank you. 
Mr. President: The motion is to circle the bill, all in favor say aye. 
Senate: Aye • 
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes. Senator Steel. 
•-Vn;!! • y •'. llui
 r « -.. ; resident. 
Senate Debate on HB 125 March 4, 2002 
54th Leg. General Session, Day 43 Tape 49 
Mr. President: Senator Julander. I'm sorry I didn't give you a mic. 
Senator Julander: We discussed this bill on Friday, and Senator Valentine raised some 
questions and had some amendments, at this time I would yield to Senator Valentine. 
Mr. President: Yes, Senator Valentine I'm sony, I'm day dreaming up here. 
Senator Valentine: There's someplace here that I had some amendments on this messy 
desk. They were passed out earlier, L I'm not quite sure where they are, have we got 
those? Mr. President I move the amendments, and amendment number one under my 
name did it March 1st, 2002. Let me explain those amendments, I raised some issues last 
time about incidental contact with precursors with the, the elements and substances that 
are in precursors. And uh, after going back and talking with some of our prosecutors we 
found we did have a problem indeed, the problem is that, uh there has to be a sufficient 
amount intended to be used in the manufacturing of a controlled substance, and then the 
intent would then be presumed by the elements that were in the present bill. But that's 
what the amendment does, it uh, makes it so that the problems that I raised last time 
would not therefore be in the bill. That's my motion to amend. 
Mr. President: Questions on the motion to amend? All in favor of the amendment say 
aye. 
Senate: Aye 
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes; the bill as before us is amended. Senator Jewel 
Julander? 
Senator Julander: Thank you, uh I don't remember having any other questions, but at this 
time I would take any other question if there are any regarding this piece of legislation. 
Mr. President: Any questions on this legislation? See none Senator. 
Senator Julander: I call for the vote that we, uh, under the suspension of the rules 
(inaudible). That we move to the third calendar. 
Mr. President: Motion is shall House Bill 123 be read for the third time, roll call vote. 
Roll call vote is done, (inaudible). 
Mr. President: Senator Bramble? 
A 
Senator Bramble: I apologize Fve been having trouble getting my computer up, out i vote 
I on this. This is a bill that I spoke with the attorney that drafted it, and we resolved the 
issues I'd misunderstood that bill So I do vote aye on it 
vlr President: No there's nobody up there Senator Hickman. 
_: Senator Hickman ? 
Mr. President: That wasn't a voice from heaven, that's the roll call. 
Senator Hickman: Aye. 
K i i l . d l C b 
Vlr. President: I'm waiting for a voice from heaven like Senator Hickman, to give me an 
jlion. Alright. House Bill 125, received 25 aye votes, no nay votes, four being 
!
 -j-ni masses to th^ third fmrnidihl^ ca^nd^** v*v>,ii nour <T(\. t-\ T-I.^IC-P niji 7^6. 
<; 
